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The literature on the governance of not-for-profit organizations is gradually growing.
Yet, the agency problems studied so far are limited to the conflict between outside donors and nonprofit managers, and much of the literature focuses on the compensation of nonprofit managers (Roomkin and Weisbrod 1999 , Brickley and Van Horn 2002 , Ballou and Weisbrod 2003 , Cornell 2004 , Fisman and Hubbard 2005 , Core, Guay, and Verdi 2006 . This literature shares a common ground with the literature on the governance of for-profit firms in the U.S. that examines executive compensation. In emerging economies, however, the key agency problem in nonprofit organizations is not necessarily due to conflict between managers and donors.
In case of for-profit organizations in emerging markets, it is well documented that the key conflict exists between the controlling family and minority shareholders (e.g. Claessens et al. 2000, Khanna and Yafeh 2007) . By forming business groups, which dominate these economies, controlling families often have power over firms that exceed their cash flow rights. As controlling-minority shareholders à la Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) , these family members have both the power and the incentive to expropriate minority investors. To describe the transfer of resources out of firms for the benefit of controlling shareholders, Johnson et al. (2000) coin the term "tunneling."
The question we ask in this paper is whether similar agency problems also exist in notfor-profit organizations in emerging economies. That is, do families with disproportionately large power over the organization relative to their initial donation level expropriate outside donors or other stakeholders, and thereby deteriorate performance? We examine such possibility using a sample of private universities in Korea.
There are several features that make tunneling likely in many of Korea's private universities. First, many private universities are under the control of founding families, but there are few mechanisms to monitor their malpractices that abuse university resources. To encourage the private sector to supply higher education services, the government has given considerable leeway to the founding families.
Second, Korean private universities are legally structured in a way that makes them prone to tunneling. The Private School Law in Korea requires that a founder first establish a private school foundation, which is an incorporated foundation. The foundation can then establish a university and other business entities, including for-profit firms. The university does not have its own board of trustees. Instead, the board of the private school foundation has the exclusive right to make all major decisions, and also all the decisions on the university's subsidiary forprofit firm matters. This legal structure gives the founding family a strong incentive to divert resources from the universities and to the for-profit entities in which it has direct or indirect equity stakes.
Examples of misbehavior are abundant, ranging from outright thefts to more subtle transactions that circumvent the law. For example, the founder may own a for-profit construction company, which he then uses to build school facilities, paying greatly inflated construction fees. Other examples include taking bribes upon the appointment of new faculty, misappropriation of tuitions for personal use, overcompensating board members and/or related administrative staff, and the personal use of university properties such as a house or vehicles. According to the results of the National Assembly inspection in 2004, losses incurred from 45 private universities and colleges due to improper management amounted to 300 billion won (300 million dollars) during the period 1999-2004.Such improper behavior often creates many campus disputes between the founding family and other stakeholders of the university, including faculty and students. During the period of 1997-2000, 44 universities were engulfed with some form of disputes (Lee, Park, and Kim, 2004) .
Using a sample of Korean private universities during 2001-2003, we find that poorly governed universities suffer more from agency problems and perform more poorly. We construct several measures of university governance and examine their links with university performances. Our measures of university performances include per-student donations, perstudent expenses, the ratio of part-time lecturers to full-time faculty, faculty research, SAT scores, and whether the university experienced a campus dispute between the founding family and other stakeholders of the university. Our measures of family commitment to improve the quality of university (good governance) are the financial transparency of the university and annual financial contributions per student made by the university founder to the university.
We measure the extent of family control (poor governance) by the number of the founder's relatives in university management and the number of restrictions on student activity.
We find that measures of good (bad) governance are positively (negatively) related to performance, and that poorly governed universities are also more likely to undergo a campus dispute. The impact of governance on performance is striking. For example, if the founder increases the amount of contributions to the university by one standard deviation, the donation increases by 1.4 million won (1,400 dollars) per student, an increase almost twice as large as the median donation. A transparent university gets 80 percent more than the median donation.
In contrast, one additional relative of the founder in university management (an increase of about one standard deviation) decreases the donation by 152,000 won (152 dollars) per student, a 20 percent drop in donation from the median donation. We also show that the results are not driven by the reverse causality that better university performance leads to better university governance.
The relevance of our results is not limited to Korea. According to Altbach (2005) , family control of private universities is prevalent in a number of countries, including Mexico, Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Argentina, India, and China. Altbach (2005) also notes that family universities are often established with the idea of making money or wielding influence, and typically have very strong and centralized administrative control, where administrative offices are in the hands of family members. This paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the related literature. Section II describes the characteristics of private universities in Korea, and Section III develops the hypothesis. Section IV describes the data and construction of our main variables. Section V presents empirical results. Section VI summarizes and concludes the paper.
I. Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of governance literature. First, it is related to the literature on the governance of non-profit organizations. To our knowledge, Fama and Jensen (1983) is the first work that examines non-profit organizations with the principal-agent framework. Since then, the literature grew, but so far limited to the conflict between outside donors and nonprofit managers. Much of the literature focuses on the compensation of nonprofit managers. This is analogous to the literature on the governance of for-profit firms in the U.S., which is dominated by papers on executive compensation. Also, most of the works are on nonprofit hospitals (Roomkin and Weisbrod 1999 , Brickley and Van Horn 2002 , Ballou and Weisbrod 2003 , Eldenburg, Hermalin, Weisbach, and Wosinska 2003 . Studies on the governance of universities, which is the subject of this paper, are limited (McCormick and Meiners 1988 and Cornell 2004) . McCormick and Meiners (1988) study the degree of faculty participation in university decision making and its impact on university performance. Cornell (2004) investigates managerial compensation in private universities.
Our paper is also closely related to the law and finance literature that increasingly underscores the importance of minority investor protection. Studies on investor protection provide convincing evidence that better protection of minority investors is related to higher values of stock markets (La Porta et al., 1997) , a greater number of listed firms (La Porta et al., 1997), a higher valuation of listed firms relative to their asset values (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002) , and greater use of external finance (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 , 2000 . Many of these studies are based on the idea of investor expropriation, also referred to show that this index, which they call the "anti-self-dealing index," predicts a variety of stock market outcomes. We provide evidence that lack of mechanisms to prevent self-dealing transactions has a strong negative impact on performance even in non-profit organizations.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature that documents a positive link between corporate governance and firm value or performance. Gompers et al. (2003) , Core et al. (2005), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
II. Characteristics of Korean Private Universities
The Korean educational market in higher education has seen a spectacular expansion since the 1970s. The enrolment figure increased from 200,000 in 1970 to 3.4 million in 2000.
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The enrolment rate in higher education is one of the highest in the world. Throughout this period of rapid expansion, the private sector supplied much of the higher education services, since the government concentrated its scarce resources mostly into primary and secondary There are several distinctive features in the structure of Korean private universities. We explain these features according to the old Private School Law (hereafter, the Law), which governed the legal structure of private universities during our study period. The Law went through a major revision in December 2005, mainly as a result of public concern over the cronyism prevailing in private schools. profit firms. The non-educational and for-profit companies are allowed by law for the purpose of generating revenue that can be transferred later to the educational entities. According to the Law, a founder must first establish a private school foundation, which in turn establishes a university. The university does not have its own board of trustees. Instead, major decisions are made exclusively by the board of the private school foundation (hereafter called the foundation board), which also makes decisions on for-profit firm matters.
Private School Foundation as a Holding
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In a sense, the private school foundation can be considered as a holding company of a pyramidal business group. The foundation has its own business units and equity holdings in many subsidiaries. The difference is that the private school foundation is a not-for-profit organization, and its major business is the provision of education services. Figure 1 illustrates this point. The founder contributes to the private school foundation and typically sits on the foundation board as a chair (link in Figure 1 ). The foundation then runs a number of educational entities (link ). To generate revenue, the foundation may run a number of non-educational businesses (link ). Instead of running the business directly, it might also hold equity stakes in for-profit firms (link ). The founding family might also have direct equity stakes in these for-profit firms or those not directly related to the foundation (link ). The dotted line in Figure 1 indicates a business-unit relationship, and the solid line indicates equity holdings.
From the perspective of a self-interested founder who runs a not-for-profit university as well as for-profit firms, the stable stream of cash flow the university generates (e.g., tuition revenue) is the first, most natural candidate for expropriation when a for-profit firm in which the founder has a large equity stake is in financial distress.
Family control. The founding family has almost complete control over the foundation board, which in turn controls all educational and non-educational entities. The Law requires that a school foundation board consist of at least seven directors, and it delegates the election of directors to the foundation board. The foundation board itself has the right to elect board members. The usual practice is to give the founder the exclusive right to nominate directors, and to let the founder himself serve as a board chairman. No other stakeholders representing students, faculty, staff, or even alumni can influence the composition of the foundation board.
The foundation board also has the exclusive right to dismiss directors. Further, it is normal practice for immediate family members or relatives to serve as board members. If the founder passes away, his or her heir normally assumes the position of a board chairman.
The Law requires that university presidents be appointed either by the foundation board or by the founder himself, and the typical foundation charter requires that the university president be appointed by the chairman of the board. The typical charter also allows a member of the board -usually the founder's immediate family member -to be appointed as university president. Members of the founding family often work as staff members of the school foundation or assume managerial positions in the university.
According to a recent survey conducted by National Assemblyman HoonSeol, 75 out of 83 universities have immediate family and/or relatives of the founder working as either board members or administrative personnel. Opaqueness. The Law requires that a private school foundation have at least two auditors. However, the typical foundation charter allows the foundation board to elect the auditors, who must carry out the challenging task of monitoring those who elect them. The foundation board also has the exclusive right to dismiss auditors. The Law requires that university budgets and accounts be reviewed by a special advisory committee. The committee should consist of at least ten members who are either professors or university staff, but the Law delegates the election of committee members to the foundation charter. The typical charter allows the foundation board to fill half of the committee with university staff, and committee members are appointed by the university president.
Not surprisingly, the disclosure of financial information is not strictly enforced. Although beginning in 2000, the Ministry of Education has required that private school foundations disclose their financial statements, the compliance rate has not been satisfactory. 4 This unsatisfactory compliance is especially true for the accounts of non-educational business units, the compliance rate of which was only 60 percent in 2003 (Lee, Park, and Kim, 2004 ).
The Law is not completely silent on rules that may constrain the founding family's control over the university. One set of rules restricts the number of the founder's relatives that can serve as foundation board members (e.g., no more than one third) and keeps relatives from serving as auditors. Also, the chairman of the board cannot serve as the university president. However, since the university president and auditors are under the control of the foundation board, which in turn is under the control of the founding family, these restrictions are not likely to be effective in constraining malpractices.
The Law gives the Ministry of Education the authority to discipline misconduct. For example, the Ministry can dismiss board members and appoint temporary directors. However, this mechanism depends solely on the willingness of the government to take action.
Historically, the government has been lenient toward founding families.
III. Hypothesis
It is well documented that Korean business groups, chaebols, suffer from serious agency problems (Bae et al., 2002; Joh, 2003; Baek et al., 2004) . The essence of the agency problems in chaebols lies in the pyramidal ownership structure of a business group that allows founding families to control the firms without actually having equity stake in them.
In many respects, private school foundations in Korea are similar to the chaebols. First, both have complex ownership structures. The ownership structure of the school foundation is similar to that of chaebols, which have many affiliated firms with a complex web of inter-firm shareholdings. Figure 2 shows the ownership structure of Daeyang Academy, the private school foundation that runs Sejong University, as of March 2003. 5 We note here that Sejong
University is just one of many businesses that Daeyang Academy runs. Daeyang Academy directly runs four educational entities (Sejong University, Seoul Sejong High School, Sejong
Elementary School, and Sejong Cyber University), and one non-educational entity (Daeyang Farm). There are also for-profit firms in which Daeyang Academy has direct or indirect equity ownerships.
Second, school foundations, like chaebols, are under the control of founding families.
This controlling power is often handed down to the founder's heir, a practice that we also observe in many of the controlling families of chaebols. Third, although they put up only a small portion of equity stakes, the controlling families of chaebols have full control over the firms within the business group, which creates an incentive to expropriate. Similarly, the founding families of school foundations have no monetary stakes in the university, but they nevertheless have complete control. As a result, they have both the incentive and the discretionary power to expropriate other stakeholders within the university to maximize their own welfare.
The main findings of corporate governance studies predict that firms with high cash flow ownership by the controlling shareholders have less expropriation risk, while those with high 5 Sejong University is one of the seemingly better private universities, ranked 13 th in terms of SAT scores as of 2002. The Daeyang Academy is under the control of the Choo family. disparity between cash flow and control rights are subject to high expropriation. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H1: Universities that have a greater financial commitment by the founder have less expropriation risk and attract more donations.
Our reasoning is that the greater the financial contributions the founder commits to the university, the less incentive he has to expropriate the university resources, since he would not have made such contributions in the first place if he planned to expropriate them. Large contributions can also signal the founder's strong commitment to build a better university, which outside donors would perceive as a lower expropriation risk. Thus, we would expect a positive relation between contributions by the founder and donations.
Less expropriation also leads to more resources being used to improve university performance, suggesting a positive link between the founder's contributions and other university performance variables. Alternatively, if the founder's contributions are great enough to ensure the provision of educational services, then the university would have less incentive to mobilize donations, suggesting a negative link between the contributions and donations.
H2: Universities that are more transparent have less expropriation risk and attract more donations.
Studies on corporate governance show that transparent firms reduce information asymmetry between managers and outside investors, reducing the cost of capital. The decrease in the cost of capital in turn leads to an increase in firm value.
6 Thus, we hypothesize that transparent universities could reduce information asymmetry between insiders (founding families) and outsiders (possible donors), which would lead to an increase in donations.
H3: Universities that are more heavily controlled by the founding families are more subject to expropriation risks and attract fewer donations.
Holding the level of commitment constant, the greater the control rights held by the founding family, the greater is the risk of expropriation. Also, the less stringent the monitoring to deter self-dealing transactions, the greater the risk of university expropriation is. Studies on corporate governance document a negative relation between control-ownership disparity and firm performance. 7 The main message of such studies is that holding ownership rights constant, the more control rights controlling shareholders have, the more incentive they have to expropriate. Based on these studies, we hypothesize that the more controlling power the founding family has, the more incentive it has to expropriate. The increase in expropriation risk will discourage future donors, leading to fewer donations. 6 In a multi-country setting, Durnev and Kim (2005) show that firms with higher transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets. Studies on cross-listing show that cross-listed firms are valued higher because of their compliance to stricter disclosure rules (Lang et al., 2003; Doidge et al., 2004; Reese and Weisback, 2003) . Studying five East Asian countries during the Asian financial crisis, Mitton (2002) shows that significantly better stock price performance is associated with firms that had indicators of higher disclosure quality (ADRs and auditors from Big Six accounting firms). In the non-profit organization literature, Desai and Yetman (2005) show that more stringent reporting requirements are associated with lower inside compensation. 7 Claessens et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2002) , Mitton (2002 ), La Porta et al. (2002 , and Lemmon and Lins (2003) show that firm value is negatively related to the control-ownership disparity.
IV. Data and Variables Construction
To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of four-year private universities in Korea during the period of 2001-2003. We exclude public universities, which differ greatly in terms of their governance structure. We also exclude universities that have existed for less than ten years as of 2001. We impose this restriction because the link between governance and university performance is likely to be different for young universities compared to more established universities. 8 This sample selection process gives a three-year panel with a sample of 259 university-year observations.
The hypothesis we want to test is that certain governance characteristics play an important role in determining university performance. However, unlike that of for-profit firms, the performance of universities is loosely defined and hard to measure. Also, different schools may have different missions, catering to different student clienteles. Hence, we measure performance of universities in a number of ways. Our main variable for university performance is annual donation per student. Other performance measures are per student expenses, fraction of part-time lecturers to full-time faculty, research per faculty, SAT scores, and campus dispute. Research per faculty and SAT scores may be relevant only for researchoriented universities. But, others are also relevant for teaching-oriented universities.
We obtain annual donation per student and annual expenditure per student from the Korea Foundation for the Promotion of Private Schools, which is a non-profit organization that provides loans to private universities. Information on the fraction of part-time lecturers comes from the Office of National Assemblyman HoonSeol. We measure faculty research by the yearly number of journal articles listed in the National Citation Report published per full-time faculty. We obtain the number of journal articles from the Ministry of Science and
Technology. The SAT scores are from Jinhaksa, a private company that produces publications on college entrance examinations.
Our final measure of performance is whether the university has experienced any dispute between the founding family and other stakeholders. Faculty and students often challenge the founding family on the use of university resources, and these challenges often lead to campus disputes. We obtain the information on campus disputes through news article searches and reports issued by the Ministry of Education.
First, we use the Korean Integrated News Database System (KINDS) to identify all articles on campus disputes. In this search, we use all ten nation-wide newspapers and five local newspapers, representing five major provinces. From this initial set, we exclude disputes that take place regularly every spring (for example, disputes over tuition increase), or those not against the school foundation. From this final set, we obtain the list of universities and the years in which disputes were featured in the newspaper. We combine this list with another list of universities whose foundation board is replaced by Ministry-appointed temporary directors. Typically, if a campus dispute reaches a stage where it cannot be resolved among the concerned parties, the Ministry steps in and replaces the foundation board members. Using these two sources, we create a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the university experienced a campus dispute or the foundation board members were replaced by the Ministry of Education, and zero otherwise.
To measure the quality of university governance, we use four different variables, two of which are our proxies for family commitment (good governance), and two that are for family control (bad governance). As the first governance measure, we use annual contributions (per student) made by the school foundation to the university (hereafter, the foundation contributions). These are contributions coming from the family that established private school foundation. Notice that these donations are not included in our measure of donation.
Otherwise the relation between performance and governance would be spurious. We also construct a measure of transparency as our proxy for good governance. We visit the websites of our sample universities and examine the disclosure of financial statement information. We create a transparency dummy that takes the value of one if we can obtain financial statements from the main page of the university website, and zero otherwise.
We use two measures as our proxies for family control (poor governance). The first measure is the number of the founder's relatives. We obtain this variable from a report issued in 2001 by the Millennium Democratic Party. The variable comprises relatives who work as the foundation's staff or assume managerial positions in the university. The second measure is the number of restrictions imposed on student activity. The seven restrictions on student activity are: 1) students must have the rector's permission to establish a new student organization; 2) students are not allowed to participate in any political activity; 3) organized student activities must be supervised by the rector or a professor in charge; 4) the university must establish a committee that supervises the activity of student organizations; 5) for any student meeting of more than ten students, prior permission must be obtained from the rector or a professor in charge; 6) any printed material must be inspected by the rector or a professor in charge; and 7) any student expelled for violence cannot be readmitted to school. We obtain information on student activity restrictions from each university's annual report.
We construct the single governance index that incorporates the information included in each of the four governance measures. First, we scale each governance variable to range from zero to one. Then we subtract the sum of bad governance variables divided by two from the sum of good governance variables divided by two. The variable ranges from a minimum of -1 to a maximum of one, with a higher score implying better governance. We call this index the Governance Index.
Our main hypothesis is that university governance affects performance. Our major concern in testing this hypothesis is that governance is only a proxy for university reputation or quality. If this were so, then the positive relation between governance and performance would be a reflection of omitted variables. That is, universities of good governance are those with a better reputation and quality, so these universities perform better. To control for university reputation, we use the number of years since its establishment. Universities with a long history and tradition tend to have better reputations and presumably attract more donations.
We also use information on whether the university has a religious mission or not. We assume that universities with such a mission have a better reputation, and thus attract more donations.
We gather information on the location of the university to determine whether it is in the metropolitan area. We regard location as an important determinant of donation. We obtain these variables from each university's annual report.
In Table 2 we provide a detailed description of each variable used in the paper. We assume that the governance variables are time-invariant. We measure the governance variables in a single year, with the exception of the foundation contributions that change across time. We measure the number of relatives as of 2001, and the number of restrictions on student activity and the transparency dummy as of 2003. We treat the campus dispute dummy as if the university experienced a dispute during the whole sample period. This treatment is reasonable given that problems existed some years before and even after the first press appearance of the dispute. The number of relatives in university management ranges between zero and four. We are surprised that the number is so small. However, this variable includes only the number of relatives who have managerial positions at the university. It does not include relatives in the foundation board or relatives without a managerial position in the university. We focus only on the relatives in a managerial position, because these people are the ones actually making important decisions over the university budget. The number of restrictions on student activity ranges between zero and seven, with mean and standard deviations of 4.1 and 2.2, respectively.
V. Empirical Results
A. Summary Statistics
The average age of the universities is around 34 years. About one third of the universities in the sample have a religious mission. More than half are in the Seoul metropolitan area. Table 3 , Panel B, shows the correlations between the variables. Per-student donation, perstudent expenses, faculty research, and SAT scores are all positively (negatively) and significantly related to the variables that are proxies for good (bad) governance. In contrast, the ratio of part-time lecturers to full-time faculty is negatively (positively) related to measures of good (bad) governance. Most of the correlation coefficients are significantly different from zero. Campus dispute is not related to most of the governance variables, with the exception of foundation contribution, to which it is negatively related.
B. The Impact of Governance on Donation
Since we use panel data, the t-values of the OLS coefficients can be biased. This bias arises because the residuals for each university are likely to be correlated over the years (temporal correlation), and the residuals might be correlated across universities within a single year (spatial correlation).
One way to address this problem is to run a regression model with university fixedeffects and year dummies. However, the data structure does not allow this. We measure all the main variables of interest in measuring university governance -transparency, number of relatives, and student activity restrictions -as time-invariant, with the exception of foundation contributions. Thus, these measures would be completely captured by university fixed-effects.
As an alternative, we use university random-effects with year dummies. Table 4 shows the results of the random-effects model, in which we regress the log of annual donation per student on governance variables with other control variables. In Model
(1), we use year dummy variables to control for any time trend, together with the age of the university (history), the religion dummy (religion), and the metropolitan dummy (metro) as additional control variables. The coefficient estimate of the history is positive and significant at the five percent significance level, which suggests that universities with a long tradition and a good reputation attract more donations. Religious universities also receive more donations, probably because of the stable provision of donations from their religious affiliations.
Universities located in a metropolitan area attract more donations, but the relation is only marginally significant with a p-value of 0.11. Although not reported here, the coefficient estimates of year dummies show that donations have been increasing over the years. The overall R 2 is 15.5 percent, suggesting that the control variables capture the variation in donations reasonably well.
In Model (2), we add the log of foundation contributions and the transparency dummy variable. These two variables are proxies for the degree of good governance. The estimates of both coefficients are positive and significant at the one percent level. The magnitude of the estimates is also economically significant. If a school foundation increases the foundation contributions by one standard deviation, the log of donation increases by 1.08, which is a rise in donation of 1.4 million won per student for a university with median donation. The increase in donation is almost two times larger than the median donation. The commitment by the founding family strongly signals to possible donors that their donations will not be expropriated, thus leading to a large increase in donation.
Transparency also has a significant impact. It increases the log of donation by 0.59, which translates into an increase of donation by 580,000 won per student. That is, a transparent university will get an 80 percent higher donation than the median donation. We also note that the overall R 2 increases to 47.3 percent, suggesting that the good governance variables are jointly important determinants of donation economically as well as statistically.
Adding the two additional governance variables decreases the magnitude and significance of the controlling variables. This attenuation in significance is partly due to a positive correlation between the governance and control variables. It also suggests that the governance variables are more important determinants of donation than are the general reputation variables.
In Model (3), we replace the family commitment variables with the family control variables. Family control variables are the number of relatives and the number of restrictions on student activities. These two variables measure the degree of poor governance. The coefficients on the number of relatives and the number of student activity restrictions are negative and significant at the one and five percent significance levels, respectively. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates is also economically significant. One additional relative of the founder in university management (approximately a one-standard deviation increase) will decrease the log of donation by 0.24, which represents a drop in donation of 152,000 won per student from the median donation of 713,000. This decrease amounts to an approximate 20 percent drop in donation. If the foundation increases the number of relatives to four, donations per student will drop by 444,000 won, a decrease of more than 60 percent.
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The impact of restriction on student activity is moderate. One additional restriction decreases the log of donation by 0.099, which is a fall in donation of 67,000 won per student, a drop of 9 percent.
In Model (4), we use all the variables together. All of the governance variables are significant and have the expected signs.
In Model (5), we use one single governance index that incorporates information on all the four governance variables used in Model (4). The coefficient on the governance index is positive and highly significant. Holding all other control variables at their mean levels, if we improve the governance index from the 25 th percentile value to the 75 th percentile value, then we see that the donation increases from 468,000 won to 1.17 million won, a 1.5 times increase. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that governance has a strong impact on donation. Table 5 presents the results of a number of robustness checks. In Models (1)- (3), we run year-by-year OLS tests. We find that the coefficient estimates on per-student contributions, the transparency dummy, and the number of relatives are all significant and have the expected signs, but that the number of restrictions on student activity is not significant. The control variables are mostly not significant, with the exception of the metropolitan dummy, which is positively related to the log of donation.
C. Robustness Checks
In Models (4) and (5), we partition the sample into non-religious and religious universities, because the governance characteristics of the two groups of universities might be different. For the non-religious universities, we find that all governance variables are significant and have the expected signs. For the religious group, the restriction on student activity is not significant.
Model (6) is the same as Model (4) in Table 4 , except that we replace the metropolitan dummy with the SAT score, which may better capture the reputation of universities in Korea.
Comparing the two models shows that the coefficients of the governance variables change very little.
As discussed previously, the governance variables are time-invariant except for the foundation contribution, which is the reason we use the random-effects model instead of the fixed-effects model. In Model (7), we estimate the fixed-effects model, in which we regress the log of donation on foundation contribution, history, SAT score, and the year dummies.
The coefficient estimate on the foundation contribution is 0.06 with a t-statistic of 1.96.
Overall, the results indicate that the impact of university governance on donation is robust to the choice of time periods, estimation method, and subsamples.
D. Alternative Performance Variables
In Table 6 , we examine other performance variables. We use the random-effects model in all regressions. In Model (1), as a performance measure, we use per-student university expenses (measured in logarithms). If the founder tunnels resources from the university to other for-profit firms, then fewer resources will be available to be spent on the university. The results show that a university with more relatives in school management and more restrictions on student activity spends less per student. In contrast, universities that are more transparent and that have more foundation contributions spend more per student.
In Model (2), we use the fraction of part-time lecturers as an alternative measure of university performance. Our reasoning is that universities that suffer more from expropriation tend to hire less full-time faculty and instead hire more part-time lecturers, who are less expensive and have little voice on university matters. The estimation result indicates that universities with more foundation contributions tend to have a lower fraction of part-time lecturers. It also shows that universities with more restriction on student activities have a higher fraction of part-time lecturers.
In Model (3), we use faculty research as the dependent variable. The results show that faculty members of universities with more relatives in school management and more restrictions on student activities have less research output. The results also show that more transparent universities tend to be more productive in the area of faculty research.
In Model (4), we replace faculty research with SAT scores. The estimation results indicate that universities with more relatives in school management and more restrictions on student activities attract fewer high-quality students.
In Model (5), we use campus dispute as the dependent variable. Since campus dispute is a binary variable, we run a probit model. The results show that universities with fewer foundation contributions and those with more restrictions on student activity tend to experience more campus disputes. Universities with a religious mission tend to suffer less from campus disputes. We note that universities with a long history tend to have a higher probability of dispute. This relation could be partly due to selection bias. Since we rely on newspaper articles to identify universities with disputes, it is possible that the measure is biased toward well-known universities with longer histories and traditions. Campus disputes in relatively new and unknown universities are not likely to attract interest from the general public, and thus are less likely to be covered by newspapers.
E. Reverse Causality
So far, we have assumed that the governance variables are exogenously determined. A major challenge in studying the relationship between governance and performance is the possibility of reverse causality. It could be that universities that receive large donations improve governance, instead of well-governed universities receiving more donations. This reverse causality is quite plausible, since donors can attach strings to their donations and force the receiving university to improve its governance. For example, a large donation can impose a condition that requires the school foundation to contribute a matching fund to the university, or a condition that requires the university to improve its transparency.
A standard way to address the issue of reverse causality is to find an instrumental variable for the governance variables, run a two-stage least squares (2SLS) test, and show that governance variables cause performance. However, we do not follow this route, because we are not able to find a good instrumental variable that has a high correlation with the governance variables but not with the performance variables. Instead, we show that performance does not cause governance change, and take it as indirect evidence that governance does cause performance.
We use the metropolitan dummy as an instrumental variable for donation and other performance variables and run 2SLS tests. In the first stage, we regress donation on the metropolitan, history, religion, and year dummies. In the second stage, we use the fitted values of donation obtained from the first stage as a variable to explain university governance, along with other control variables. If the coefficient on the fitted donation values is statistically insignificant, it shows that an exogenously determined donation does not cause change in governance. We take this result as evidence against reverse causality.
The metropolitan dummy satisfies all the conditions of a good instrumental variable.
First, it is exogenous. It is hard to imagine that a university would change its location because of donations or other measures of university performance, such as faculty research. Second, the metropolitan dummy is highly correlated with annual donations. The correlation between the two variables is 0.27 and significant at the one percent level. Third, it is not correlated with the Governance Index. The correlation between the two is 0.04 with a p-value of 0.56.
For this reason, in the following tests of reverse causality, we focus on the relation between university performance and the Governance Index.
Each panel in Table 7 shows the 2SLS results. In Panel A, we see that donation does not cause the degree of university governance. In Model (1), we run the first-stage regression, regressing the log of donation on the metropolitan dummy and other control variables. We note that the coefficient estimate on the metropolitan dummy is highly significant.
In Model (2), we run the second-stage regression of Governance Index on the fitted values of log of donation from Model (1) with the history, religion, and year dummies as controls. The coefficient estimate on the fitted values of the log of donation is insignificant (a t-value of 0.6), which suggests that donation does not cause the change in governance.
We conduct similar tests in the subsequent panels for four other performance variables:
per-student expenses, ratio of part-time lecturers to full-time faculty, faculty research, and SAT scores. The second-stage regression in each panel shows that the performance variables do not cause governance.
Although we cannot completely dismiss the possibility of reverse causality, we conclude that the correlation between governance and performance exists, not because performance causes governance, but because governance affects performance.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the agency problems of Korean private universities. In many Korean private universities, founding families have almost total discretionary power over management, while there are few mechanisms to monitor their misbehavior. We argue that such a governance structure creates strong incentives for founding families to expropriate university resources for their own benefit, at the expense of students, faculty and other stakeholders in the university.
The empirical results and anecdotal evidence appear consistent with the following scenario. Poor university governance increases the expropriation risk and a higher probability of expropriation discourages donations. Good researchers stay away from those universities, leading to poor faculty research. As a result of expropriation, per-student expenses are low and more part-time lecturers are hired, leading to poor educational services. In the most extreme circumstances, campus disputes take place.
The dominance of family control over private schools in the Korean education market is not confined to higher education. According to the Ministry of Education, as of 2005, there are 821 private school foundations and 1,391 primary and secondary schools, and one fifth of these schools' principals are related to founding families. Among the 821 foundations, 21.7 percent, or 178, school principals are spouses of board chairmen, children, siblings, or other relatives. Given the evidence presented in this paper, such family control is likely to lead to poor educational services in primary and secondary schools.
Poor school governance appears to have many ramifications in social costs. To put this number in perspective, we note that it equals nearly 11 percent of the annual government budget for education.
The social costs incurred due to poor school governance appear enormous and could be a source of serious long-term concern for the Korean economy. Given the prevalence of family control over for-profit firms in emerging economies, we suspect other emerging economies are likely to suffer from similar agency problems in school governance. It would be 29 interesting to document the extent of agency problems in not-for-profit organizations from other emerging economies. Per Student Expenses Annual university expenditure per student (in thousand won). We obtain this information from the Korea Foundation for the Promotion of Private Schools, a non-profit organization, the business of which is to provide loans to private universities.
Part-Time Lecturers
Ratio of part-time lecturers to full-time faculty members. We obtain this information from the Ministry of Education.
Faculty Research
Yearly number of articles published per full-time faculty in the journals listed in the National Citation Report. We obtain this information from the Ministry of Science and Technology.
SAT Average test score of admitted students in government-administered college entrance examination. We obtain this information from Jinhaksa, a private company that produces publications on college entrance examinations.
Campus Dispute Dummy variable that is equal to one if the university experiences a dispute between the founding family and other stakeholders during the sample period, and zero otherwise. We obtain this information from the Korean Integrated News Database System (KINDS).
Governance Variables
Good governance variables that proxy for family commitment to improve the university Foundation Contributions Annual contribution per student contributed by school foundation to university (in thousand won). Foundation contributions are not included in donations. We obtain this information from the Korea Foundation for the Promotion of Private Schools.
Transparency Dummy variable that is equal to one if financial statements are available from the main page of the university's website, and zero otherwise. The data source is each university's homepage.
Bad governance variables that proxy for family control over the university Relatives Number of relatives in university management (either working at the school foundation or the university). The variable does not include relatives on the board of the school foundation and those relatives with no managerial positions. We obtain this information from a report issued by the Millennium Democratic Party.
Restrictions
Number of restrictions on student activity. We obtain this information from each university's annual report.
Governance Index To construct the single governance index that incorporates the information included in each governance measure, we scale each governance variable such that it ranges from zero to one. Then, we subtract the sum of bad governance variables divided by two from the sum of good governance variables divided by two. That is, governance index = [(Contribution/12521) + (Transparency)] / 2 -[(Relatives/4) + (Restriction/7)] / 2. The variable can range from the minimum of -1 to the maximum of one. A higher score implies better governance.
Control Variables
History Number of years since its establishment. We obtain this information from each university's annual report.
Religion Dummy variable that is equal to one if the university has a religious mission, and zero otherwise. We obtain this information from the Association of Private School Foundations.
Metro
Dummy variable that is equal to one if the university is located in the Seoul metropolitan area (including Incheon and Kyunggi Province), and zero otherwise. We obtain this information from each university's annual report. Notes: The table presents the regression results of the random effects model in which we regress the log of donation per student on the governance and control variables. All variables are defined in Table 2 . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. (4) and (5) use random effect regression for the subsamples of non-religious and religious universities, respectively. Model (6) replaces the metropolitan dummy with the SAT score to control for university reputation. Model (7) runs a fixed-effect model. All variables are as defined in Table 2 . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 
TABEL 3-SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS
Notes:
The table presents the regression results of the random effects model in which we regress university performance measures on the governance and control variables. As alternative measures of university performance, Model (1) uses the log of per-student expenses, Model (2) the ratio of part-time lecturers to full-time faculty, Model (3) faculty research, Model (4) SAT scores, and Model (5) a dummy variable for campus disputes. All variables are as defined in Table 2 . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. (1), we estimate the first-stage regression of 2SLS, regressing the performance variable on the metropolitan dummy (the instrumental variable), control variables, and year dummies, which are exogenously determined. The metropolitan dummy takes the value of one if the university is located in the metropolitan area, and zero otherwise. In Model (2), we estimate the second-stage regression of 2SLS, regressing the governance index on the fitted values of donation exogenously determined by the metropolitan dummy, control variables, and year dummies. In Model (1), we use the metropolitan dummy as an instrument for the performance variable. All variables are as defined in Table 2 . Panels A, B, C, D, and E use as their performance variables the log of per student donation, log of per student expenses, ratio of part-time lecturers to full-time faculty, faculty research, and SAT scores, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
